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Primary Education in India:  
Prospects of Meeting the MDG Target 
 




Education is now widely valued not only for its intrinsic value in enriching the 
lives of individuals but also for its functional value in the development of the human 
capital of a nation. Educational investments in children have been shown to have high 
private and social returns. The private returns are associated with increased 
productivity and earnings in adulthood, and with further non-pecuniary gains arising 
from the greater efficiency with which educated individuals are able to acquire and 
process information (e.g. Rosenzweig 1995). The social premium to education over 
and above the private value includes further productivity increases arising from 
knowledge spillovers, gains in health for one generation that flow from gains in 
education for the previous, and the improved functioning of civic society and 
democracy. These examples illustrate that widespread education not only helps 
growth through productivity effects, but is also crucial to distribution of the gains 
from growth. Growth in a society in which most people have a basic education is most 
likely more pro-poor than growth in a society in which the educated are the elite few. 
Also, there is widespread evidence of an inter-generational correlation in educational 
attainment (e.g. Becker and Tomes 1986), at least some of which is thought to be 
causal (e.g. Lleras-Muney 2001, Chevalier 2004). To the extent that the impact of 
parental education on child education is causal, there are significant knock-on effects 
of public investment in education. In other words, they payoff to policy immediately 
goes up because investments in education at any one time have a multiplier effect, 
yielding additional benefits in the future. In summary, education is a powerful tool for 
reducing poverty, unemployment and inequality, improving health and nutrition and 
promoting sustained human development led growth (World Bank (2004), p.69). 
  One of the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) agreed in September 2000 
at a UN summit of world leaders is the achievement of universal primary school 
attendance for boys and girls. This, of course, implies a complete closing of the   4 
gender gap. It also requires a 100% primary school completion rate, that is, that all 
students entering grade 1 are retained until grade 5. The MDG couched in these terms 
reflects recognition of the i mportance of basic (primary) education. This is 
particularly pertinent in India where primary education has historically been neglected 
by the state, with educational expenditures being concentrated on the tertiary sector 
(e.g. Dreze and Sen 1995). As a result, there are vast inequalities in educational 
attainment in India, a remarkable degree of illiteracy coexisting with frontier research 
in science and technology. India is also marked for being one of the group of 
countries in South Asia and Northern Africa where outcomes tend systematically to 
be better for boys than for girls, suggesting gender discrimination or at least 
undesirable gender differentiation. A further reason that India offers an interesting 
case study is that it exhibits striking diversity in educational indicators across its states 
that, in further work, we will exploit to consider more carefully the sorts of policy 
interventions that are likely to be effective.
1 With India being such a large country, 
sample sizes available for statistical analysis are large, allowing more general pursuit 
of heterogeneity in the data- for example by religion (Muslims have lower educational 
attainment than Hindus) or by caste (scheduled castes and tribes exhibit lower 
educational attainment than the higher-castes).  
  The NFHS data that we describe below show that, in India in 1998/9, the 
school attendance rate was 82.5% and the primary school completion rate was 61.7%. 
We argue in this paper that it is challenging, a priori, to expect both of these rates to 
rise to 100% by 2015. 
 
2. Data and Definitions 
The data used in the analysis are from the two rounds of the National Family 
Health Survey of India (NFHS), conducted in 1992/3 and in 1998/9, respectively. 
Although this survey was primarily concerned with reproductive and child health, the 
household questionnaire of the survey contains information on schooling for every 
individual in the surveyed household. The survey covered the 26 main states of India, 
                                                 
1 For instance, nearly half of all children aged 6 -11 who were not in school in 1999/2000, 
according to the NSS data, were in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, with a further 11% being in 
Madhya Pradesh. There is further geographic concentration at the village level. Just 10% of 
villages in India account for nearly 50% of all out-of-school children aged 6-11 while 20% of 
all villages account for 75% of all out-of-school children (World Bank 2004; p.77).   5 
interviewing 88563 households in 1992 and 92486 in 1998. In 1992/3, 69% and, in 
1998/9, 66% of households reported living in rural areas. For rural households, we 
have merged in information on relevant infrastructure indicators that is available from 
a village questionnaire. In 1992, 485 villages were surveyed and, in 1998, 622.  An 
advantage of household survey data over administrative data is that the latter often 
exaggerate school enrolment, possibly because this reflects well on school 
administrators and district officials, and because public expenditure allocations to 
schools and districts are often based upon the number of enrolled students (e.g. World 
Bank 2004). 
As education is on the concurrent list of the constitution, it is partially a state 
subject. As a result, there are some differences in school structure and in definitions of 
progression across states. We will not concern ourselves with these here as we are 
interested in applying a uniform scale across all states, with a view to assessing the 
likelihood of India as a whole attaining the MDG for education.  
  In this paper, we look at two indicators, primary school attendance and the 
primary school completion rate. For each of these, the analysis is conducted first for 
all children and then for boys and girls separately. Primary school age is defined as 6-
11 years. This corresponds to grades 1-5, and is sometimes referred to as lower-
primary.
2 The primary school attendance or enrollment rate is the ratio of the number 
of children aged 6-11 attending school to the total number of children aged 6-11. We 
are further interested in the completion rate since, i n many developing countries, 
including India, it is common that children enroll in school but then fail to progress, 
or dropout. This may reflect the quality of schools but it may alternatively reflect the 
volatility of parental incomes, children being taken out of school in response to 
unanticipated income shocks (e.g. Jacoby and Skoufias 1997). The completion rate is 
defined as the ratio of the number of children aged 12 at the time of the survey who 
report having completed primary school to the number of children aged 12 who report 
having enrolled in primary school. Ideally, we would use longitudinal data that allow 
us to follow a child through school, to completion. In the absence of such data, 
retrospective information such as available in the NFHS for level of schooling 
completed at the time of interview, is a second-best alternative.  
                                                 
2 The next three years (age 12-14) are then referred to as u pper primary (e.g. World Bank 
2004, Chapter IV). Upper primary may alternatively be referred to as middle school. And 
lower and upper primary together are sometimes referred to as elementary education.   6 
There are approximately 70,000 children aged 6 -11 in each year and 
approximately 11,000 aged 12 (exact sample sizes are in the Tables). Construction of 
the estimation samples is described in Table 1. Comparing (weighted) averages from 
the two rounds of the survey shows that attendance amongst 6-11 year-olds increased 
from 69.5% in 1992/3 to 82.5% in 1998/9, and that growth in attendance was more 
rapid for girls than for boys (see bottom of Table 4). In contrast, the primary school 
completion rate declined, from 65.3% to 61.7%. The decline was larger for girls than 
for boys, suggesting that the gender gap in completion widened even as the gap in 
attendance shrunk (see bottom of Table 5).  
Means and standard deviations of all microdata variables used in the analysis 
are in Table 2, where we also present a t-test of the significance of the difference of 
the means in the two years (this is defined in the Notes to the Table). Summary 
statistics for the state-level data used in the analysis are in Table 3. 
 
3. Related Literature and Contributions 
Closely related to the current paper is a recent analysis of education and health 
conducted for the World Bank by Anil Deolalikar (World Bank (2004); also see 
Deolalikar 2005). Motivated in the same spirit as the current analysis, to assess the 
likelihood of India attaining the MDG in education, this study provides a 
comprehensive analysis of primary schooling is India. It uses the 55
th round of the 
National Sample Survey (NSS), conducted in 1999/2000. Multivariate probits are 
estimated for primary school attendance, school attendance and primary completion 
rates. The study finds that the largest marginal effects are associated with household 
living standards, access to electricity and expenditure on elementary schooling.  
The parameter estimates obtained for 1999/2000 are used to simulate 
indicators of school achievement in 2015 under three alternative scenarios. All of 
these involves an assumed change in each of nine predictor variables that were 
significant in the estimated model. Consider the attendance equation. Here, these are 
adult schooling amongst men and women, household consumption, annual public 
expenditure on elementary education per 6 -14 year-old child, and the following 
indicators of district-level conditions: village access to pucca roads and electricity, the 
number of primary schools per 1000 children, the pupil-teacher ratio at the primary 
level, and crimes against (kidnappings of) women and girls. Since the education   7 
deficit is concentrated in the poor states (see footnote 1), the simulations group the 
Indian states as poor and non-poor. In the first scenario, the specified characteristics 
in the poor states are brought up to the national average. In the second scenario, they 
are brought up to the average for the non-poor states. In the third scenario, they are 
increased at a specified rate per annum between 1999/2000 and 2015. The specified 
rate is set for each of the nine variables in an ad hoc way, to illustrate the possibilities. 
The predicted outcomes for 2015 get progressively more encouraging as one moves 
from the first to the third scenario. The overall conclusion in this study is that 
attaining the MDG for education is extremely unlikely in the poor states and, as a 
result, in India as a whole.  
The current study employs definitions of school outcomes similar to those 
used by World Bank (2004) and it estimates multivariate probits that are similarly 
specified. However, we use the NFHS data rather than the NSS, which is useful in 
that it provides an opportunity to cross-check the results of one study against the 
other. A contribution of the current study is that it uses repeated cross-sectional data 
(two rounds of the NFHS) to investigate the growth in schooling indictors. It then 
assesses the extent to which (a) the predictor variables actually change and (b) the 
parameters are stable over time. We find that the predictor variables change much less 
than hypothesized in the illustrative simulations conducted in World Bank (2004).
3 
For example, in scenario-3, the assumed annual change in male and female years of 
schooling is 0.25 and 0.3 respectively. Between 1992/3 and 1998/9, these variables 
increased (for the sample of 6-11 year olds) by only 0.055 and 0.066 years per year 
respectively. We also find that the parameters are not stable over time, which makes it 
very difficult to extrapolate to the future. Indeed, we find that almost all of the growth 
in schooling can be attributed to changes in the elasticities. We caution against the 
common practice of making predictions on the assumption of stable parameters, while 
recognizing that there may be no better alternative. We conclude that the prospect of 
India attaining universal primary attendance is good, but that the prospect of attaining 
universal completion rates in primary school is bleak unless a major intervention is 
undertaken.  
 
                                                 
3 Anil Deolalikar clarifies that the figures he uses i n Deolalikar (2005) and World Bank 
(2004) are only illustrative. Also, despite more optimistic assumptions on the rate of growth 
of variables that improve schooling probabilities, his conclusions are, like ours, pessimistic.   8 
4. Analytical Approach 
Educational enrolment at any time will depend upon supply and demand 
factors. In a competitive markets framework, education is an investment in human 
capital and the extent of this investment will depend only upon its relative rate of 
return. When credit markets are imperfect, or when parents value education of their 
children as a consumption or a status good (e.g. Banerjee 2004) then parental wealth 
also affects the level of education demanded. A role for religion, gender and ethnicity 
in further determining the demand f or education may be argued to arise from 
differences in tastes, opportunity costs (wages) or perceived returns along these 
dimensions. Empirically, the demand for education can be modeled like the demand 
for any other good, as a function of total resources (parental wealth), relative prices 
(rates of return), demographics and taste-shifters. Supply-variables like access to 
school are included in the model to allow for disequilibria: not everyone who 
demands education can have it; see Ham (1986) for similar reasoning for the inclusion 
of the regional unemployment rate in models of labour demand. The estimated 
equations are similar to those in numerous previous studies of educational enrollment 
and progression (e.g. Behrman and Knowles 1999).   
Our approach to developing projections to 2015 is as follows. We estimate 
equations for selected educational indicators for each of the years, 1992/3 and 1998/9, 
for all children and also separately for boys and girls. We analyse changes in 
schooling outcomes between 1992/3 and 1998/9, decomposing them into changes in 
characteristics (regressors, X) and changes in model parameters ( b’s). We then 
assume that the contribution of the evolution of variables over time is the same 
between 1998/9 and 2015, as between 1992/3 and 1998/9. 
 
5. Empirical Model 
As the outcomes analysed in this paper are binary indicator variables (0/1), they are 
modeled as probits and the parameters estimated by maximum likelihood. We 
estimate separate equations for each year, rather than pool the data. The data are, 
however, pooled across the states, state fixed effects being included to allow for all 
state-level unobservables. This will include political-economic variables, historically 
determined attitudes to education and initial conditions. The socio-economic status of 
the household is captured by wealth indicators, adult education and demographics.   9 
For rural areas, we include indicators of the supply of schooling at the village level. 
Since no similar information is available for urban regions, these variables appear in 
interaction with a dummy for whether the household lives in a rural area. If a variable 
has a sufficiently large number of missing values then, rather than discard all 
observations with any missing data, we create a dummy to indicate missing values 
and include this in the model as an additional regressor; this is the case for caste and 
religion. 
Estimates of the attendance equations for each year and each gender are in 
Table 4, while estimates of the completion equations are in Table 5. The independent 
variables in the attendance and completion models are the same, with one exception. 
Since the attendance equation is for 6-11 year-olds, it includes a set of age dummies 
and, in the sample that pools genders, this is interacted with a dummy for whether the 
child is a girl (1) or a boy (0). The completion equation, which is for 12 year-olds, 
simply includes a gender dummy.  
To take account of the survey design, all estimates are weighted using weights 
available in the datafile. Reported standard errors are robust to arbitrary forms of 
heteroskedasticity that we expect are likely given clustering in the data structure. 
Tests of the joint significance of subsets of variables (e.g. village infrastructure, state 
fixed effects) are reported in the Tables. The contribution of the state fixed-effects to 
the total explained variation as measured by the Pseudo R-squared is also reported in 
the Tables. 
 
Explaining The State Fixed Effects 
In a second stage of the analysis, we investigate what state-level variables might 
explain the observed state fixed effects in the estimated micro-level equations. The 
state dummy coefficients are saved for each year and then pooled to generate a panel 
with T=2. The panel of state fixed effects coefficients is merged with a panel of data 
on state-level GNP, inequality, education expenditure and other relevant predictors. 
We have time series data on these predictor variables (refer Besley and Burgess 2002, 
2004; we are grateful to these authors for allowing us to use the data they have 
compiled). We have constructed five-year averages of the predictors, over the five 
years preceding the data of the NFHS survey (ie. 1987/8-1992/3 for NFHS1 and 
1993/4-1998/9 for NFHS2). 
   10 
6. Results 
The probit results are reported in Tables  4 and 5. Discussion of the individual, 
household and village-level effects is detailed in Bhalotra and Zamora (2006) and 
summarized in section 8 below. The state dummies are jointly highly significant in 
both years and most are individually significant. They explain around 2 to 4 (2 to 6) 
percent of the total variance in attendance (completion) after controlling by the 
remaining variables. The second-stage results which take the state fixed effects from 
the probits for each year, pool them and regress them on state-level variables are in 
Table 6. The state-level variables displayed in Table 6 explain 89% (71%) of the state 
variation in attendance (completion) that remains after conditioning on household 
wealth, education and demographics and, for rural households, on some infrastructure 
indicators. The rest of this section describes the state-level effects in some detail as 
these are particularly relevant to the design of interventions aimed at improving 
schooling outcomes. 
The female illiteracy rate significantly reduces attendance and completion for 
both genders. For attendance, this effect is four times as large for girls as for boys but, 
for completion, it is only marginally larger for girls. The male illiteracy rate has no 
effect (not shown), nor does the ratio of the female to the male illiteracy rate (shown). 
Real p.c. GNP (net state domestic product) has a significantly positive effect 
on attendance, and no effect on completion. The attendance effect is larger for girls 
than for boys. At a given level of GNP, the share of education expenditure in GNP has 
a positive effect on attendance, although no effect on completion. We also included 
the fraction of education expenditure that goes towards primary education but this was 
insignificant in every specification. The ratio of development expenditure to state 
GNP has a significant effect on both attendance and completion (although 
significance is marginal for girls’ completion), even after controlling for education 
expenditure. Development expenditure includes, in addition to expenditure on 
education, expenditure on health, famine relief and food subsidies. It would, of 
course, be relevant to policy to know which elements of state development 
expenditure impact on educational outcomes. We included the share of  health 
expenditure in the equation, expecting that it may have a positive impact, especially 
on completion, given that there is considerable evidence that children with poor health   11 
join school late or drop out early (e.g. Alderman et al 2003). However this variable 
had no effect in any of the equations, and so it was not retained.  
The ratio of rural to urban consumption (mean real consumption per capita) 
has a positive effect on attendance for both genders, the effect being almost twice as 
large for girls as for boys. We also see a hint of a positive effect on girls’ completion 
rates. The higher is the rural-urban consumption ratio, the lower is between-sector 
inequality. Since schooling outcomes are worse in rural areas, this result is plausible. 
We included the Gini coefficient to capture within-sector inequality for each of the 
rural and urban sectors. As both coefficients were insignificant, they were dropped. 
Poverty within each of these sectors is measured by the poverty gap index. We find 
that higher rural poverty is associated with lower attendance, but there is no effect on 
completion. Urban poverty is insignificant in every specification.  
The number of elementary schools (i.e. lower and upper primary; see footnote 
2) has a positive effect on attendance but no effect on completion. The ratio of female 
to male teachers in primary schools encourages attendance though, unexpectedly, this 
effect is not larger for girls than for boys. Also possibly unexpected is the result that 
the feminization of the teacher workforce adversely affects completion, this effect 
being greater for girls than for boys!. This variable deserves further investigation. The 
year dummy indicates that, other things equal, unobservables specific to the year 
1998/9 pushed attendance rates down and completion rates up.   
 
7. Decomposition and Simulation 
This section reports estimates of the extent to which the change in school attendance 
and completion rates between 1992/3 and 1998/9 can be attributed to changes in 
characteristics. It then simulates the change from 1998/9 to 2015, applying alternative 
weighting schemes corresponding to the estimated elasticities for 1992/3 and 1998/9 
respectively. 
For the purpose of developing projections of the school indicators to 2015, 
based on the evolution of predictor variables between 1992/3-1998/9, it is convenient 
to have a one-step model that shows the impact of state and household level variables 
on mortality all at once. We therefore replace the state fixed effects with the state-
level variables that appeared as regressors in stage-2 above. Having confirmed that 
the linear probability model gives results similar to the probit, we use the linear   12 
estimator for this one-step model. The estimates are reported in Appendix Tables 1 
and 2. These are the equations that the decomposition described below is based upon. 
Note that the effective sample is reduced from 26 to 15 states, these being the states 
for which the state-level data are available. This means that the results cannot be 
directly compared with those reported earlier. Further differences between the results 
reported in Tables 4 -6 and those in the Appendix Tables may be explained by 
correlations between the state-level variables and other regressors in the Appendix 
Tables.   
A standard if  ad h oc and questionable way of making extrapolations or 
predictions is to assume that the parameters of a model are stable and to predict 
changes in the outcome from changes in the predictor variables. When only a single 
cross-section of data is available, there may be no choice but to assume parameter 
stability. However, there is no a priori reason to believe that the relation of interest is 
time-invariant. The probability of attending or completing school is bounded between 
zero and one, and we may expect the marginal effect of “inputs” to get smaller as 
educational outcomes improve. Alternatively, it may be argued that there are 
diminishing returns to some inputs. For instance, the positive effect of access to 
television on schooling outcomes may decline as TV sets become common enough 
that the relevant information has diffused through the community. This may explain 
our finding that the effect of the number of TV sets per capita in a village raises 
attendance and completion probabilities in 1992/3, but not in 1998/9 (see Tables 4, 5). 
In the current study, we estimate the same model on each of two rounds of 
data. As a result, we can investigate the assumption that the elasticities are constant 
over time (i.e the same in the 1998/9 survey as in the 1992/3 survey). In particular, we 
assess the extent to which the observed change in schooling between the two periods 
can be attributed to changes in the predictor variables over that period versus changes 
in the parameters. 
Decomposition of differences in outcomes has a long history following the 
pioneering work of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). Most applications perform 
decompositions in order to compare two groups of people, such as men and women 
(as in Oaxaca and Blinder), or Hindus and Muslims (as in Bhalotra and van Soest 
2004). In this case, the change attributable to differences in sample characteristics is 
regarded as “explained” while that attributable to differences in parameters between 
the two groups is thought of as “unexplained” and, therefore, potentially related to   13 
discrimination. Discrimination aside, the same ideas apply to the decomposition of 
changes over time that we undertake in this paper. To the extent that the average 
values of predictors change over time, we would expect the outcome to change over 
time. For example, we may find that the increase in school attendance observed can 
be attributed, in part, to an increase in the fraction of villages with a primary school. 
But if attendance in 1998/9 were to respond less to an increase in the supply of 
schooling than it did six years before, then we would find a smaller increase in 
attendance than if the elasticity were constant over time.  
Most applications of the decomposition methodology have been to linear 
models. The procedure can be extended i n a fairly straightforward manner to 
nonlinear models such as the probit (see Yun 2004). However, the detailed 
decomposition (i.e. decomposition by individual variable or by specified sub-groups 
of the regressor set) is harder to interpret in the non-linear model. For this reason, we 
report decompositions based upon the linear probability model. The coefficients used 
to weight changes in the predictor variables are those obtained from a pooled model.
4  
Refer Table 7. Consider attendance first. The increase in attendance rates of 
boys and girls over the six-year period, 1992/3-1998/9, is predicted to be 9.8 and 16.7 
%-points respectively, close to the actual increases of 9.5 and 16.3 %-points. Most of 
this is explained by the regressors: 78% in the case of boys and 67% in the case of 
girls. Decomposition by sub-group shows that most of the explained variation, in turn, 
is on account of the state-level variables. Assuming that the per annum change in 
attendance rates that is attributable to the regressors remains the same between 1998/9 
and 2015 as it was between 1992/3 and 1998/9, and weighting by the coefficients 
estimated on a model that pools the 1992/3 and 1998/9 data, we predict primary 
school attendance rates to be 100% in 2015 for both boys and girls. 
Now consider completion rates, for which the predicted change between 
1992/3 and 1998/9 is 3.4% for boys and 5% for girls. These predicted changes are 
much more positive than the actual changes which were –3.1% for boys and –4.3% 
for girls. As in the case of attendance, most of the predicted change is accounted for 
by growth in the regressors: 65% in the case of boys and 90% in the case of girls. Our 
predictions for the year 2015 are that completion rates will rise from 61.6% in 1998/9 
to 65.2% for boys and from 61.8% in 1998/9 to 70% for girls. A positive feature of 
                                                 
4 Stata provides an excellent summary in the help-file for the command “Oaxaca”.   14 
these results is that the gender gap appears set to reverse. However, for neither boys 
nor girls are completion rates set to rise to anywhere near 100%. 
 
8. Conclusions 
Comparing educational data for children in the 1992/3 and 1998/9 surveys, we find 
that primary school attendance grew for both boys and girls in the age range 6-11, 
indeed, more rapidly for girls. However reported completion rates for 12 year old 
children deteriorated in this time-frame.  
We find that the elasticities of models for these schooling outcomes do change 
between 1992/3 and 1998/9, as a consequence of which any projections we make are 
sensitive to which elasticities we use to weight the contribution of the change of 
variables over time. We use elasticities from a model that pools the 1992/3 and 
1998/9 data. Assuming that the predicted change due to the regressors is the same 
between 1998/9-2015 as it was between 1992/3-1998/9, we project that all girls and 
boys aged 6 -11 will be attending primary school by the year 2015, but that, 
conditional upon enrolling, only 65% of boys and 70% of girls at age 12 will have 
completed primary school. 
Putting the fairly positive results for attendance together with the worrying 
results for completion rates serves to highlight the importance of late entry and 
dropout. It suggests that the causes of late entry and dropout are not to be found 
amongst variables conventionally analysed- such as household wealth, distance to 
school or maternal education. This is an area that merits further exploration.  
The policy-amenable variables “macro” (state-level) variables that have 
contributed to changes in attendance and completion between 1992/3-1998/9 and that 
therefore need to be monitored now include female literacy, GNP p.c., the share of 
education and development expenditure in GNP, poverty rates within the rural and 
urban sectors, and the disparity in living standards between rural and urban areas (ie 
the difference in average consumption expenditure between the two sectors).  
Other significant predictors of attendance rates, observed at the microlevel in 
our data, include the presence of primary and middle schools in the village (in the 
case of rural India) and, at least in the first survey-year, the prevalence of TV sets. 
Wealth and living conditions at the household level are also relevant, significant 
indicators being an index of household possessions, whether the household has access   15 
to electricity, and whether it has a separate room for cooking. The higher the 
educational level of the most educated adult in the household, the greater is the 
likelihood that a child in that household is attending school. It does not seem to matter 
to attendance rates whether this person is a man or a woman. However, where the 
head of the household is a woman, children are more likely to be in school. Children 
are less likely to attend school when the principal-female (head or head’s wife) in the 
household is working. As the proportion of women in work is expected to rise, this 
factor will constrain increases in attendance unless the parameters of the model 
change to nullify this effect (the latter is a real possibility since increases in women’s 
labour force participation have, historically, been associated with wider structural 
change in the organization of both markets and households). Children in larger 
households are less likely to attend school and, for a given household size, children of 
primary school age are less likely to attend if children under the age of  five are 
present in the household. These results suggest that, if India experiences further 
reductions in fertility, it will see further rises in school attendance. There are some 
significant compositional effects on attendance, indicating that scheduled c astes, 
scheduled tribes and Muslims are less likely to have children attend school. Age 
dummies in the model are consistent with late entry, especially amongst boys. At 
every age, girls are less likely than boys to be attending school, the gender gap 
tending to increase with age. 
Looking at the regressions for completion rates, we find there was little 
positive change growth between 1992/3 and 1998/9. Consider what we have learnt 
about the variation in completion rates in a given year. Amongst state-level or macro-
variables, the two-step analysis indicates that only the female literacy rate is a 
significant predictor of completion rates, although the one-step analysis reported in 
Appendix Table 2 suggests a wider range of influences. Amongst variables in the 
micro-data, the presence of a middle or a secondary school in the village (in rural 
India) has a positive impact on completion probabilities, consistent with the notion 
that children will be less likely to complete primary if there is nowhere to go after. 
Wealthier households, as indicated by a durables index, are more likely to have 
children complete primary school. The educational level of the most educated adult in 
the household is significant and, in contrast to the attendance results, completion rates 
are further favoured by the most educated adult being a woman. Completion is also 
more likely when the household head is a woman and, as in the case of attendance,   16 
less likely when the principal female is working. Large families and, further, families 
with small children appear to find it harder to support their children through primary 
school. Although scheduled tribe children are less likely to complete, in contrast to 
the attendance results, children from scheduled castes and from Muslim families are 
no less likely to complete. An important finding is that, holding constant a rich set of 
household and state level covariates, girls are less likely than boys to complete 
primary school, the probability differential being 0.05 in 1992/3 and rising to 0.07 in 
1998/9. Overall, the results suggest that a first step towards improving completion 
rates would be to close the gender-gap in completion. The results also suggest that the 
improvements in the overall female literacy rate in the state will contribute to 
improving primay completion rates for boys and girls. 
As discussed, further research is required into the determinants of completion 
rates. We suggest that factors such as poor health may delay enrollment and weaken 
cognitive ability and therefore progression. At the same time, school curricula that are 
uninteresting to the children or irrelevant to their future earnings prospects, or 
timetables that conflict with peak agricultural seasons may be important constraints 
on completion. A further possibility is that children enroll but then fail to complete 
because the household is subject to an income or health shock that makes the 
opportunity cost of schooling too high for the family to afford at the time. Once a 
child has dropped out, she or he may not enroll again. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Selection of the Samples for Analysis 
1.1. Sample selection for school attendance 
 
  NFHS92/93  NFHS98/99 
  # obs.  %  # obs.  % 
Children aged 6-11 of the facto population*  74510   100  71479  100 
Dropped observations         
(1) missing answer whether attending school  367   0.49  283   0.40 
(2) missing value in years of education of highest 
adult 
69   0.09  31  0.04 
(3) missing answer in distance to nearest town  166   0.22  236  0.33 
(4) missing answer in distance to pucca road  1148   1.54  658   0.92 
Attendance Sample  72841  100  70392   100 
Boys attending school  30322  41.63  31958   45.40 
Boys not attending school  7613   10.45  4549   6.46 
Girls attending school  23876   32.78  27335   38.83 
Girls not attending school  11030   15.14  6550   9.31 
* de facto population estimated  with population who slept the night previous to the survey in the household 
 
1.2. Sample selection for primary school completion 
 
  NFHS92/93    NFHS98/99   
  # obs.  %  # obs.  % 
Children aged 12 of the facto population  14204  100  14086  100 
Dropped observations         
(1) no education or unknown education level  3212  22.61  2108  14.97 
(2) missing value in years of education of highest 
adult 
21  0.15  12  0.09 
(3) missing answer in distance to nearest town  36  0.25  42  0.30 
(4) missing answer in distance to pucca road  207  1.46  130  0.92 
Primary Completion Sample  10834  100  11659  100 
Boys who have completed primary  3984  36.77  4050  34.74 
Boys who have not completed primary  2191  20.22  2473  21.21 
Girls who have completed primary  3118  28.78  3270  28.05 
Girls who have not completed primary  1541  14.22  1946  16.69 
* de facto population estimated  with population who slept the night previous to the survey in the household 
 
 
Table 2. Microdata Sample Statistics (weighted by all India sample weight
1) 
  Attendance Sample  Completion Sample 
  Mean(92/93)Mean(98/99)  t ratio 
3 Mean(92/93)Mean(98/99)  t ratio
 3 
Age 7  0,167 0,163  1.63  --- ---  --- 
Age 8  0,189 0,191  -0.77  --- ---  --- 
Age 9  0,144 0,141  0.69  --- ---  --- 
Age 10  0,197 0,201  -1.16  --- ---  --- 
Age 11  0,126 0,127  0,000  --- ---  --- 
Female  0,479 0,482  -0.78  0,410 0,438  -2.19* 
Pucca house  0,212 0,277  -23.8**  0,270 0,315  -6.8** 
Own flush toilet  0,141 0,153  -4.73**  0,192 0,178  1.26 
Electricity  0,476 0,551  -19.5**  0,573 0,613  -2.53* 
Potable water into the house  0,392 0,385  4.64**  0,455 0,400  7.0** 
Separate room for cooking  0,530 0,468  24.1**  0,609 0,526  12.9**   20 
Land owner  0,558 0,536  -0.12  0,567 0,550  0.34 
Livestock owner  0,603 0,546  11.8**  0,578 0,555  2.12* 
Durables index  -0,332 -0,321  6.4**  0,084 -0,069  8.4** 
Rural* pucca house  0,080 0,128  -25.5**  0,094 0,143  -8.7** 
Rural* own flush toilet  0,038 0,049  -7.2**  0,052 0,057  0.09 
Rural* electricity  0,276 0,338  -16.7**  0,320 0,369  -2.9** 
Rural* potable water into the house  0,239 0,238  0.14  0,260 0,237  3.3** 
Rural* separate room for cooking  0,378 0,327  16.1**  0,409 0,358  7.6** 
Rural* land owner  0,510 0,488  1.92  0,508 0,494  0.87 
Rural* livestock owner  0,557 0,506  9.7**  0,525 0,509  0.92 
Rural*Durables index  -0,256 -0,431  31.8**  -0,104 -0,276  13.7** 
Schooling years of highest educ. Adult  5,948 6,316  -13.8**  7,369 6,983  2.51* 
Highest educated adult is female  0,448 0,446  3.4**  0,371 0,398  -1.62 
Household size  7,639 7,514  6.4**  7,495 7,260  4.9** 
Proportion of females under five  0,066 0,062  4.8**  0,042 0,037  2.7** 
Proportion of males under five  0,073 0,068  4.0**  0,044 0,041  1.36 
Proportion of females aged 6 to 16  0,194 0,199  -5.3**  0,193 0,201  -2.30* 
Proportion of males aged 6 to 16  0,208 0,210  2.19*  0,233 0,236  0.16 
Proportion of females aged 17 to 30  0,106 0,110  -4.5**  0,085 0,088  -1.64 
Proportion of males aged 17 to 30  0,070 0,065  8.6**  0,075 0,068  5.5** 
Proportion of females aged +50  0,040 0,039  -0.24  0,040 0,039  -0.61 
Proportion of males aged +50  0,037 0,034  4.1**  0,041 0,038  2.6** 
Household head female  0,063 0,072  -0.15  0,079 0,080  2.22* 
Child of head  0,746 0,742  5.6**  0,783 0,789  1.1 
Principal female working 
2  0,260 0,314  -13.9**  0,254 0,300  -4.1** 
Rural resident  0,754 0,765  -5.7**  0,707 0,736  -3.3** 
Scheduled caste  0,128 0,193  -28.6**  0,114 0,184 -11.6** 
Scheduled tribe  0,094 0,096  -5.8**  0,072 0,084  -2.9** 
Muslim  0,148 0,157  -12.4**  0,128 0,146  -7.0** 
Christian  0,020 0,020  3.5**  0,026 0,025  3.6** 
Other religion  0,032 0,029  3.5**  0,038 0,033  2.20* 
Rural*Distance to nearest town  13,803 11,183  12.7**  12,541 10,571  2.55* 
Rural*Distance pucca road  1,863 3,368  -45.7**  1,520 3,194 -20.8** 
Distance to pucca road* primary School  1,665 3,012  -44.0**  1,392 2,846 -19.3** 
Distance to pucca road* girl  0,896 1,641  -31.4**  0,533 1,385 -14.9** 
Table 1 Continued         
Rural* Village electrified  0,556 0,608  -20.8**  0,550 0,603  -8.7** 
Rural* Primary School in village  0,666 0,685  -12.9**  0,635 0,665  -6.5** 
Rural* Middle School in village  0,379 0,381  -9.0**  0,386 0,396  -4.0** 
Rural* Secondary School in village  0,207 0,214  -1.92  0,213 0,221  -0.5 
Rural* Bank in village  0,179 0,163  7.7**  0,188 0,171  3.8** 
Rural* Post Office in village  0,344 0,354  -3.7**  0,347 0,350  -0.42 
Rural*Number of tv sets per 1000 hab.  5.230 16,956  -10.1**  5,724 18,453  -3.6** 
Rural* missing number of tv sets  0,007 0,031  -18.9**  0,007 0,030  -7.6** 
          
Notes          
1. Sample weight inversely proportional to the variance of an observation       
2. Female head or spouse of head          
3 t statistic test of the nul hyphotesis mean(92/93)-mean(98/99)=0         
* significant at 5% ** signficant at 1%          
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Table 3: Annual Growth Rates of State Level Variables: 
(% p.a.) in 1982-1999 

























AndhraPradesh  5.00  1.43  0.98  -12.1  -8.19  1.90  -0.83  0.31  6.22 
Assam  3.12  3.05  5.66  -8.63  16.8  -0.85  -1.28  -2.71  64.5 
Bihar  4.10  2.68  4.18  -2.87  -10.7  -1.68  -0.64  0.41  0.11 
Gujarat  6.39  1.66  2.45  -6.91  -7.46  0.23  -1.40  0.60  1.52 
Haryana  -----  0.54  2.29  6.23  -12.5  -4.70  -1.36  1.18  12.5 
Jammu  1.59  7.66  6.16  34.5  21.9  -9.22  -0.87  1.16  -0.12 
Karnataka  5.39  0.80  1.40  -10.5  -11.7  0.99  -1.39  0.40  7.82 
Kerala  5.63  0.93  -0.15  -7.99  -11.2  -2.10  -6.65  1.12  3.51 
MadhyaPradesh  4.77  1.82  2.79  -6.29  -0.79  -0.57  -0.87  0.91  3.32 
Maharashtra  5.14  -0.08  2.69  -11.7  -1.29  1.32  -1.84  0.58  2.49 
Orissa  5.30  1.88  4.04  -1.93  -8.31  6.61  -1.19  0.32  -1.21 
Punjab  5.12  3.03  1.43  3.41  -15.4  -4.02  -1.77  0.69  -0.79 
Rajasthan  5.72  2.29  2.98  -4.45  -2.27  -1.34  -0.58  1.35  72.6 
Tamil Nadu  6.09  0.37  1.25  -10.1  -4.72  5.64  -1.57  -0.28  0.68 
WestBengal  4.71  1.63  3.28  -5.71  -14.5  0.45  -1.64  0.36  115.5 
UttarPradesh  3.80  1.01  3.02  -5.12  -12.1  -1.96  -0.86  0.74  1.31 
                   
All India  4.79  1.92  2.78  -3.13  -5.14  -0.58  -1.55  0.45  18.1 
Notes: These are the growth rates of the variables that are significant in the regression shown in Table 6 below. In Table 6, we use the average of the variable 
over the five years preceding the date of the survey. To describe the overall trend in these variables, we now present data for 1982-99, that is, starting 10 years 
before the date of the first survey (1992/3). GDP is state net domestic product, p.c. is per capita, devexp is development expenditure, eduexp is education 
expenditure, urb is urban, consumpt is consumption. Precise definitions of all variables are in Bhalotra and Zamora (2006).    22 
Table 4. Probit Estimates of School Attendance among 6-11 year old Children. 
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NFHS98/
99   
  Total  Boys  Girls  Total  Boys  Girls
Child age and gender effects           
Age 7  0.1208  0.0939  0.1086  0.0640  0.0523  0.0614
  (15.70)**  (15.90)**  (10.70)**  (13.70)**  (13.77)**  (10.24)**
Age 8  0.1626  0.1271  0.1207  0.0734  0.0601  0.0602
  (23.23)**  (23.25)**  (12.22)**  (16.01)**  (15.91)**  (10.09)**
Age 9  0.1640  0.1279  0.1297  0.0758  0.0631  0.0637
  (21.03)**  (21.13)**  (11.90)**  (14.25)**  (14.64)**  (9.27)**
Age 10  0.1575  0.1236  0.0942  0.0621  0.0524  0.0251
  (18.42)**  (18.12)**  (8.39)**  (10.28)**  (10.33)**  (3.32)**
Age 11  0.1519  0.1212  0.0620  0.0544  0.0473  0.0055
  (15.19)**  (15.35)**  (4.60)**  (6.98)**  (7.45)**  (0.57)
female* Age 6  -0.1042  ----  ----  -0.0426  ----  ----
  (7.72)**  ----  ----  (3.98)**  ----  ----
female* Age 7  -0.1589  ----  ----  -0.0689  ----  ----
  (11.11)**  ----  ----  (5.61)**  ----  ----
female* Age 8  -0.2176  ----  ----  -0.0868  ----  ----
  (16.29)**  ----  ----  (7.50)**  ----  ----
female* Age 9  -0.2108  ----  ----  -0.0895  ----  ----
  (13.52)**  ----  ----  (6.30)**  ----  ----
female* Age 10  -0.2329  ----  ----  -0.1101  ----  ----
  (17.10)**  ----  ----  (9.74)**  ----  ----
female* Age 11  -0.2684  ----  ----  -0.1219  ----  ----
  (15.93)**  ----  ----  (7.89)**  ----  ----
Assest effects           
Pucca house  0.0365  0.0214  0.0607  0.0048  -0.0004  0.0118
  (2.34)*  (1.06)  (2.62)**  (0.44)  (0.03)  (0.74)
Own flush toilet  0.0116  0.0287  -0.0192  0.0112  0.0176  0.0013
  (0.65)  (1.31)  (0.68)  (0.96)  (1.19)  (0.07)
Electricity  0.0704  0.0557  0.0746  0.0437  0.0304  0.0592
  (4.04)**  (2.51)*  (2.94)**  (3.05)**  (1.52)  (2.79)**
Potable water into the house  0.0118  0.0004  0.0319  0.0114  0.0061  0.0188
  (0.72)  (0.02)  (1.34)  (0.98)  (0.40)  (1.09)
Separate room for cooking  0.0356  0.0328  0.0394  0.0298  0.0208  0.0408
  (2.32)*  (1.68)  (1.81)  (2.65)**  (1.41)  (2.38)*
Land owner  -0.0168  0.0141  -0.0626  0.0215  0.0296  0.0135
  (0.88)  (0.55)  (2.29)*  (1.31)  (1.31)  (0.57)
Livestock owner  -0.0009  0.0107  -0.0137  0.0127  0.0150  0.0099
  (0.05)  (0.45)  (0.54)  (0.75)  (0.63)  (0.42)
Durables index   0.0401  0.0295  0.0502  0.0204  0.0170  0.0239
  (9.56)**  (6.33)**  (7.63)**  (7.12)**  (5.08)**  (5.55)**
Rural* pucca house  0.0049  -0.0012  0.0095  0.0153  0.0010  0.0307
  (0.23)  (0.04)  (0.32)  (0.97)  (0.04)  (1.39)
Rural* own flush toilet  0.0228  0.0002  0.0423  0.0061  -0.0080  0.0204
  (0.75)  (0.00)  (0.97)  (0.27)  (0.24)  (0.64)
Rural* electricity  -0.0137  -0.0186  0.0092  -0.0250  -0.0198  -0.0294
  (0.69)  (0.70)  (0.34)  (1.30)  (0.74)  (1.07)  23 
Rural* potable water into the house  0.0159  0.0243  0.0013  0.0015  0.0067  -0.0062
  (0.90)  (1.05)  (0.05)  (0.10)  (0.35)  (0.29)
Rural* separate room for cooking  0.0079  0.0033  0.0118  -0.0124  -0.0041  -0.0228
  (0.47)  (0.15)  (0.51)  (0.88)  (0.22)  (1.10)
Rural* land owner  0.0585  0.0332  0.0932  -0.0025  -0.0006  -0.0065
  (2.90)**  (1.19)  (3.22)**  (0.14)  (0.02)  (0.26)
Rural* livestock owner  -0.0098  -0.0144  -0.0074  -0.0077  -0.0144  0.0007
  (0.49)  (0.55)  (0.26)  (0.45)  (0.58)  (0.03)
Rural*Durables index  0.0080  0.0101  0.0084  0.0114  0.0103  0.0133
  (1.11)  (1.24)  (0.75)  (3.05)**  (2.37)*  (2.36)*
Education and Demographic effects           
Schooling years of highest educated adult  0.0260  0.0189  0.0344  0.0138  0.0105  0.0180
  (29.17)**  (19.40)**  (24.57)**  (24.27)**  (15.95)**  (20.76)**
Highest educated adult is female  0.0019  -0.0094  0.0139  0.0116  0.0040  0.0205
  (0.20)  (0.75)  (1.11)  (1.40)  (0.35)  (1.72)
Log Household size  -0.0465  -0.0400  -0.0633  -0.0403  -0.0393  -0.0450
  (8.08)**  (6.04)**  (7.07)**  (10.47)**  (8.75)**  (7.62)**
Proportion of female members under five  -0.2296  -0.1424  -0.3435  -0.1850  -0.1016  -0.2856
  (6.64)**  (3.64)**  (6.21)**  (8.16)**  (3.78)**  (8.04)**
Proportion of male members under five  -0.2236  -0.1328  -0.3421  -0.1842  -0.1356  -0.2413
  (6.42)**  (3.38)**  (6.16)**  (7.98)**  (4.99)**  (6.68)**
Proportion of female members aged 6 to 16  -0.0750  -0.0164  -0.1773  -0.0728  -0.0405  -0.1153
  (2.23)*  (0.45)  (3.15)**  (3.29)**  (1.64)  (3.19)**
Proportion of male members aged 6 to 16  -0.1324  -0.1458  -0.0944  -0.1385  -0.1318  -0.1471
  (3.90)**  (3.78)**  (1.76)  (6.18)**  (4.95)**  (4.26)**
Proportion of female members aged 17 to 30  0.1076  0.0877  0.1288  0.1135  0.1010  0.1275
  (3.67)**  (2.71)**  (2.74)**  (5.85)**  (4.63)**  (4.13)**
Proportion of male members aged 17 to 30  -0.2666  -0.2100  -0.3428  -0.1744  -0.1165  -0.2522
  (8.61)**  (6.16)**  (6.82)**  (8.36)**  (4.87)**  (7.64)**
Proportion of female members aged more than 50  0.0793  0.0302  0.1587  0.0134  0.0057  0.0140
  (1.86)  (0.64)  (2.30)*  (0.45)  (0.16)  (0.29)
Proportion of male members aged more than 50  0.0191  0.0165  0.0189  -0.0372  -0.0445  -0.0240
  (0.42)  (0.33)  (0.26)  (1.19)  (1.24)  (0.48)
Household head female  0.0416  0.0284  0.0624  0.0196  0.0047  0.0414
  (3.20)**  (1.69)  (3.34)**  (2.69)**  (0.46)  (4.38)**
Child of head  0.0306  0.0269  0.0354  0.0182  0.0238  0.0126
  (3.42)**  (2.22)*  (2.77)**  (2.99)**  (3.31)**  (1.32)
Principal female working  -0.0489  -0.0504  -0.0437  -0.0421  -0.0316  -0.0555
  (6.78)**  (5.49)**  (4.34)**  (32.85)**  (10.47)**  (16.68)**
Scheduled caste  -0.0247  -0.0130  -0.0409  -0.0206  -0.0101  -0.0346
  (2.81)**  (1.10)  (3.25)**  (3.10)**  (1.05)  (3.78)**
scheduled tribe  -0.0814  -0.0769  -0.0835  -0.0707  -0.0636  -0.0801
  (7.60)**  (5.61)**  (5.44)**  (16.05)**  (12.16)**  (8.85)**
Muslim  -0.0936  -0.0991  -0.0815  -0.0507  -0.0586  -0.0429
  (10.07)**  (8.64)**  (5.95)**  (11.92)**  (8.19)**  (4.72)**
Christian  -0.0170  -0.0224  -0.0130  0.0404  0.0372  0.0433
  (0.73)  (0.76)  (0.37)  (3.04)**  (2.11)*  (2.07)*
Other religión  -0.0013  -0.0025  0.0024  -0.0011  -0.0144  0.0189
  (0.07)  (0.10)  (0.09)  (0.07)  (0.63)  (0.93)
Rural infrastructure effects           
Rural resident  -0.0732  -0.0403  -0.1182  0.0140  0.0193  0.0059  24 
  (3.49)**  (1.46)  (3.99)**  (0.76)  (0.78)  (0.22)
Rural*Distance to nearest town  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0004  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0003
  (1.27)  (0.47)  (1.49)  (2.49)*  (2.21)*  (1.49)
Rural*Distance pucca road  -0.0013  -0.0024  -0.0007  0.0016  0.0007  0.0025
  (0.97)  (1.79)  (0.37)  (2.41)*  (1.04)  (2.47)*
Rural*Distance to pucca road* primary School  -0.0004  0.0004  -0.0010  -0.0012  -0.0006  -0.0019
  (0.29)  (0.26)  (0.50)  (1.73)  (0.88)  (1.80)
Rural*Distance to pucca road* girl  -0.0008  ----  ----  -0.0003  ----  ----
  (0.94)  ----  ----  (0.73)  ----  ----
Rural* Village electrified  0.0037  0.0096  0.0014  0.0098  0.0058  0.0132
  (0.43)  (0.84)  (0.11)  (1.63)  (0.70)  (1.50)
Rural* Primary School in village  0.0314  0.0373  0.0200  0.0244  0.0209  0.0305
  (2.79)**  (2.50)*  (1.21)  (2.93)**  (1.95)  (2.47)*
Rural* Middle School in village  0.0204  0.0045  0.0374  -0.0010  0.0009  -0.0029
  (2.42)*  (0.39)  (3.19)**  (0.16)  (0.10)  (0.32)
Rural* Secondary School in village  0.0053  -0.0030  0.0158  0.0097  0.0040  0.0167
  (0.55)  (0.23)  (1.18)  (1.40)  (0.40)  (1.70)
Rural* Bank in village  0.0050  0.0025  0.0088  -0.0010  0.0011  -0.0037
  (0.51)  (0.19)  (0.61)  (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.31)
Rural* Post Office in village  -0.0147  -0.0139  -0.0111  -0.0039  -0.0034  -0.0044
  (1.71)  (1.20)  (0.91)  (0.62)  (0.40)  (0.49)
Rural*Number of tv sets in village per 1000 habitants  0.0007  0.0002  0.0012  0.0000  -0.0000  0.0001
  (3.06)**  (1.17)  (3.13)**  (0.52)  (0.83)  (1.36)
Rural* missing number of tv sets  0.0553  0.0322  0.1021  -0.0191  -0.0008  -0.0366
  (1.73)  (0.69)  (2.50)*  (1.16)  (0.04)  (1.52)
State fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Variables available only  for 1998/99           
Other Backward Caste  ----  ----  ----  -0.0076  0.0029  -0.0213
  ----  ----  ----  (1.07)  (0.31)  (2.11)*
Missing Caste  ----  ----  ----  -0.0232  -0.0210  -0.0238
  ----  ----  ----  (1.76)  (1.26)  (1.27)
Missing religion  ----  ----  ----  -0.0092  0.0512  -0.0905
  ----  ----  ----  (0.15)  (1.05)  (0.80)
           
Mean dependent variable  0.6971  0.7646  0.6242  0.8252  0.8603  0.7872
Observations  72841  37935  34906  69456  36027  33429
Pseudo R-squared  0.2787  0.2343  0.3079  0.2285  0.2071  0.2457
Pseudo R-squared due to state fixed effects  0.0280  0.0195  0.0426  0.0201  0.0146  0.0298
Log Pseudolikelihood  -32221  -15850  -15991  -24828  -11554  -13051
Wald Chi2  8634  3862  5372  5634  2641  36429
F Age effects  593**  606**  197**  290**  306**  186**
F gender*age effects  1028**  ----  ----  420**  ----  ----
F assets effects  309**  153**  191**  188**  91**  122**
F rural*assets effects  79*  43**  68**  42**  22*  34**
F Village vars. Effects  71**  42**  55**  31**  15  28**
F Household demographics  2108**  1110**  1355**  1595**  827**  1051**
F state effects  1571**  622**  1325**  753**  286**  705**
           
Notes to Table 3:           
1 Head or spouse of head           
·Interaction of rural residence with assets variables is included to capture the difference of the impact of       25 
assets variables in rural as opposed to urban households.      
·Interaction of rural residence with infrastructure variables is necessary as there is no corresponding urban information.  
The F tests at the end of the Table are tests of joint significance of the named groups of variables. 
Absolute value of Robust z-statistics in parentheses           
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level           
 
 
Table 5. Probit Estimates of School Completion among 12 year old Children. 
 
Marginal Effects Estimates (weighted by all India sample 
weights) 
  NFHS92/93     
NFHS98/
99     
  Total  Boys  Girls  Total  Boys  Girls 
Gender             
Female  -0.0484  ----  ----  -0.0620  ----  ---- 
  (2.98)**  ----  ----  (4.19)**  ----  ---- 
Assets effects            
Pucca house  0.0373  0.0501  0.0128  0.0371  0.0654  0.0089 
  (1.37)  (1.36)  (0.29)  (1.43)  (1.91)  (0.21) 
Own flush toilet  -0.0152  -0.0370  0.0086  0.0842  0.0846  0.0825 
  (0.54)  (0.92)  (0.21)  (3.43)**  (2.46)*  (2.23)* 
Electricity  0.0827  0.1080  0.0475  0.1113  0.0777  0.1594 
  (2.20)*  (2.19)*  (0.78)  (2.44)*  (1.36)  (2.10)* 
Potable water into the house  0.0190  0.0346  0.0007  0.0324  0.0374  0.0185 
  (0.65)  (0.84)  (0.02)  (1.18)  (1.00)  (0.45) 
Separate room for cooking  0.0482  0.0570  0.0438  0.0384  0.0540  0.0108 
  (1.76)  (1.48)  (1.10)  (1.48)  (1.53)  (0.28) 
Land owner  0.0125  0.0025  0.0314  -0.0430  -0.0301  -0.0707 
  (0.36)  (0.05)  (0.63)  (1.29)  (0.65)  (1.48) 
Livestock owner  -0.0088  0.0006  -0.0250  0.0125  0.0513  -0.0231 
  (0.27)  (0.01)  (0.53)  (0.39)  (1.17)  (0.48) 
Durables index   0.0523  0.0431  0.0623  0.0190  0.0083  0.0343 
  (6.25)**  (3.79)**  (5.07)**  (2.27)*  (0.76)  (2.69)** 
Rural* pucca house  0.0013  -0.0056  0.0266  -0.0206  -0.0298  -0.0200 
  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.47)  (0.59)  (0.64)  (0.36) 
Rural* own flush toilet  0.0101  0.0081  0.0047  -0.0408  -0.1000  0.0302 
  (0.22)  (0.12)  (0.07)  (0.96)  (1.75)  (0.49) 
Rural* electricity  -0.0153  -0.0458  0.0349  -0.0769  -0.0671  -0.0961 
  (0.36)  (0.81)  (0.52)  (1.55)  (1.07)  (1.19) 
Rural* potable water into the house  -0.0022  0.0003  -0.0153  -0.0314  -0.0393  -0.0133 
  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.30)  (1.00)  (0.91)  (0.28) 
Rural* separate room for cooking  -0.0221  -0.0437  0.0115  -0.0199  -0.0335  0.0037 
  (0.70)  (1.01)  (0.24)  (0.68)  (0.83)  (0.09) 
Rural* land owner  0.0617  0.0724  0.0411  0.0406  0.0421  0.0630 
  (1.57)  (1.36)  (0.70)  (1.13)  (0.84)  (1.22) 
Rural* livestock owner  -0.0212  -0.0004  -0.0451  0.0046  -0.0312  0.0380 
  (0.55)  (0.01)  (0.78)  (0.13)  (0.63)  (0.70) 
Rural*Durables index  -0.0207  -0.0123  -0.0298  0.0227  0.0362  0.0047 
  (1.59)  (0.70)  (1.52)  (1.96)  (2.37)*  (0.27) 
Education and demographics effects           
Schooling years of highest educated adult  0.0200  0.0186  0.0233  0.0239  0.0235  0.0253 
  (10.33)**  (7.23)**  (8.02)**  (13.52)**  (9.81)**  (9.69)**   26 
Highest educated adult is female  0.0676  0.0634  0.0671  0.0538  0.0497  0.0600 
  (3.79)**  (2.76)**  (2.33)*  (3.40)**  (2.34)*  (2.52)* 
Log Household size  -0.0251  -0.0131  -0.0466  -0.0315  -0.0279  -0.0495 
  (1.72)  (0.67)  (2.08)*  (2.29)*  (1.48)  (2.45)* 
Proportion of female members under five  -0.1230  -0.0646  -0.1974  -0.5574  -0.3909  -0.7775 
  (1.26)  (0.49)  (1.35)  (5.81)**  (3.03)**  (5.37)** 
Proportion of male members under five  -0.3802  -0.3242  -0.4255  -0.5408  -0.3345  -0.7959 
  (3.85)**  (2.52)*  (2.70)**  (5.72)**  (2.65)**  (5.50)** 
Proportion of female members aged 6 to 16  -0.0499  -0.0246  -0.1183  -0.0825  0.0690  -0.3000 
  (0.61)  (0.23)  (0.94)  (1.10)  (0.70)  (2.53)* 
Proportion of male members aged 6 to 16  -0.1037  -0.0623  -0.1218  -0.3571  -0.2642  -0.4625 
  (1.27)  (0.58)  (0.96)  (4.60)**  (2.58)**  (3.75)** 
Proportion of female members aged 17 to 30  -0.0730  -0.0564  -0.0743  -0.1412  -0.0911  -0.2175 
  (0.99)  (0.59)  (0.66)  (2.07)*  (1.02)  (2.04)* 
Proportion of male members aged 17 to 30  -0.3890  -0.4216  -0.3795  -0.5598  -0.5110  -0.6471 
  (4.84)**  (4.05)**  (2.99)**  (7.13)**  (5.03)**  (5.19)** 
Proportion of female members aged more than 50  0.0141  -0.0148  0.0556  -0.1187  0.0543  -0.3655 
  (0.14)  (0.11)  (0.34)  (1.19)  (0.41)  (2.42)* 
Proportion of male members aged more than 50  0.1561  0.1715  0.1551  0.0105  0.1805  -0.2043 
  (1.54)  (1.30)  (0.98)  (0.11)  (1.42)  (1.35) 
Household head female  -0.0003  0.0005  0.0068  0.0726  0.0421  0.1170 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.17)  (3.43)**  (1.31)  (5.71)** 
Child of head  -0.0167  -0.0444  0.0218  0.0337  0.0521  0.0105 
  (0.88)  (1.78)  (0.73)  (1.96)  (2.16)*  (0.44) 
Principal female working  -0.0177  -0.0409  0.0163  -0.0536  -0.0346  -0.0776 
            
Scheduled caste  0.0057  0.0139  -0.0097  -0.0087  -0.0130  -0.0003 
  (0.29)  (0.54)  (0.29)  (0.47)  (0.52)  (0.01) 
scheduled tribe  -0.0937  -0.0621  -0.1412  -0.0595  -0.0905  -0.0309 
  (3.34)**  (1.74)  (3.09)**  (2.44)*  (2.82)**  (0.86) 
Muslim  -0.0847  -0.1068  -0.0530  -0.1273  -0.1627  -0.0926 
  (3.89)**  (3.70)**  (1.53)  (6.06)**  (5.82)**  (3.20)** 
Christian  -0.0386  0.0603  -0.1471  -0.0893  -0.1805  0.0276 
  (0.85)  (0.99)  (2.24)*  (1.72)  (2.95)**  (0.36) 
Other religion  -0.0098  -0.0500  0.0303  -0.0866  -0.1043  -0.0666 
  (0.28)  (1.04)  (0.59)  (2.21)*  (2.14)*  (1.06) 
Rural infrastructure effects           
Rural resident  -0.0151  -0.0183  -0.0316  0.1007  0.0716  0.1019 
  (0.30)  (0.28)  (0.38)  (1.76)  (0.96)  (1.17) 
Rural*Distance to nearest town  -0.0006  -0.0007  -0.0004  -0.0004  0.0006  -0.0018 
  (1.40)  (1.37)  (0.53)  (0.79)  (0.79)  (2.23)* 
Rural*Distance pucca road  -0.0111  -0.0140  -0.0075  0.0003  0.0014  -0.0004 
  (2.06)*  (2.07)*  (0.96)  (0.12)  (0.52)  (0.12) 
Rural*Distance to pucca road* primary School  0.0127  0.0144  0.0091  0.0005  -0.0014  0.0019 
  (2.32)*  (2.07)*  (1.11)  (0.23)  (0.48)  (0.54) 
Rural*Distance to pucca road* girl  -0.0030  ----  ----  -0.0004  ----  ---- 
  (0.95)  ----  ----  (0.32)  ----  ---- 
Rural* Village electrified  0.0120  0.0069  0.0253  0.0199  0.0272  0.0083 
  (0.55)  (0.25)  (0.68)  (0.98)  (1.00)  (0.27) 
Rural* Primary School in village  0.0094  0.0402  -0.0404  -0.0332  -0.0198  -0.0376 
  (0.32)  (1.07)  (0.80)  (1.23)  (0.54)  (0.97)   27 
Rural* Middle School in village  0.0014  0.0131  -0.0084  -0.0028  -0.0250  0.0289 
  (0.07)  (0.51)  (0.27)  (0.16)  (1.08)  (1.24) 
Rural* Secondary School in village  0.0525  0.0629  0.0315  0.0321  0.0333  0.0288 
  (2.58)**  (2.30)*  (0.97)  (1.70)  (1.27)  (1.10) 
Rural* Bank in village  0.0251  0.0132  0.0463  -0.0216  -0.0412  -0.0063 
  (1.16)  (0.44)  (1.45)  (1.02)  (1.39)  (0.22) 
Rural* Post Office in village  -0.0442  -0.0611  -0.0179  0.0284  0.0290  0.0282 
  (2.21)*  (2.31)*  (0.57)  (1.68)  (1.25)  (1.18) 
Rural*Number of tv sets in village per 1000 habitants  0.0011  0.0009  0.0016  0.0000  0.0006  0.0000 
  (2.82)**  (1.83)  (2.18)*  (0.33)  (1.90)  (0.11) 
Rural* missing number of tv sets  -0.0799  -0.0488  -0.1264  -0.0336  0.0069  -0.0739 
  (1.04)  (0.49)  (1.03)  (0.82)  (0.13)  (1.15) 
State fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Variables available only for 1998/99            
Other Backward Caste  ----  ----  ----  -0.0086  -0.0135  -0.0059 
  ----  ----  ----  (0.52)  (0.61)  (0.24) 
Missing Caste  ----  ----  ----  -0.0751  -0.0700  -0.0815 
  ----  ----  ----  (2.32)*  (1.67)  (1.64) 
Missing religion  ----  ----  ----  -0.0711  0.2358  -0.0742 
  ----  ----  ----  (0.42)  (0.89)  (0.42) 
            
Mean dependent variable  0.6530  0.6473  0.6612  0.6167  0.6156  0.6181 
Observations  10834  6175  4659  11659  6476  5183 
Pseudo R-squared  0.1608  0.1468  0.2000  0.2093  0.1951  0.2465 
Pseudo R-squared due to state fixed effects  0.0273  0.0243  0.0346  0.0519  0.0473  0.0628 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -5868  -3419  -2386  -6136  -3472  -2596 
Wald Chi2  1363**  765**  653**  1914**  1102**  921** 
F assets effects  107**  58**  53**  75**  40**  41** 
F rural*assets effects  37**  28**  14  17  14  16 
F Village vars. Effects  37**  28**  13  13  12  15 
F Household demographics  218**  131**  123**  435**  255**  221** 
F state effects  365**  200**  186**  647**  363**  326** 
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Table 6: Stage-2 Results 
Regression of the State Fixed Effects on State-Level Variables 
 
  Attendance  Completion 
  All  Boys  Girls  All  Boys  Girls 
             
log real GNP p.c.  1.448**  1.240**  1.637**  -0.457  -0.659  -0.249 
  [4.70]  [3.65]  [5.21]  [0.64]  [0.93]  [0.33] 
log (development expenditure/GNP)  0.667*  0.677*  0.694*  1.274  1.445*  1.141 
  [2.32]  [2.27]  [2.21]  [1.89]  [2.14]  [1.63] 
log (education expend/GNP)  1.450*  1.257  1.598**  -1.038  -1.376  -0.733 
  [2.71]  [2.12]  [3.11]  [1.07]  [1.45]  [0.71] 
rural poverty gap index   -0.009**  -0.010**  -0.008  -0.004  -0.004  -0.004 
  [2.99]  [3.55]  [1.82]  [0.54]  [0.49]  [0.50] 
urban poverty gap index  0.014  0.016*  0.012  0.001  -0.005  0.006 
  [1.69]  [2.27]  [0.97]  [0.07]  [0.29]  [0.32] 
rural/urban mean p.c. consumption  0.346**  0.231*  0.433**  0.251  0.178  0.332 
  [3.50]  [2.19]  [4.59]  [1.09]  [0.75]  [1.57] 
female illiteracy rate   -1.245**  -0.495  -1.969**  -2.368**  -2.303**  -2.701** 
  [4.33]  [1.38]  [6.31]  [3.36]  [3.02]  [4.11] 
female/male illiteracy rate  0.084  0.285  -0.091  -0.232  -0.164  -0.399 
  [0.44]  [1.40]  [0.42]  [0.68]  [0.47]  [1.15] 
female/male teachers in prim school  0.004**  0.005**  0.004*  -0.010**  -0.009*  -0.012** 
  [3.69]  [3.97]  [2.38]  [3.03]  [2.69]  [3.56] 
number of elementary schools   0.000**  0.000*  0.000**  -0.000  -0.000  0.000 
  [3.82]  [2.39]  [4.44]  [0.20]  [0.43]  [0.11] 
dummy for year-98/99  -0.590**  -0.455**  -0.705**  0.345  0.457*  0.205 
  [5.00]  [3.67]  [5.74]  [1.68]  [2.36]  [0.89] 
Constant  2.475**  1.774**  3.137**  2.486*  2.219*  3.053** 
  [4.37]  [3.46]  [4.26]  [2.56]  [2.12]  [3.13] 
             
Observations  28  28  28  28  28  28 
R-squared  0.89  0.84  0.91  0.71  0.72  0.71 
Notes: The state fixed effects are estimates from Tables 4 and 5. All reported standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity. Year-1 is 1992/3 and year-2 is 1998/9; these refer to the two rounds of the NFHS 
survey. The regressors are, in each round, averages over the six years preceding the date of the survey.   29 
Table 7: Decomposition & Prediction Based on the Linear Probability Model  
  Attendance  Completion 
  Total  Boys  Girls  Total  Boys  Girls 
Predicted Change between 1992/93 and 
1998/99  13.10%  9.79%  16.66%  4.05%  3.40%  4.98% 
  (0.0036)  (0.0042)  (0.0051)  (0.0084)  (0.0111)  (0.0129) 
1. Predicted Change due to variables  9.32%  7.56%  11.17%  3.06%  2.16%  4.45% 
  (0.0030)  (0.0034)  (0.0042)  (0.0067)  (0.0423)  (0.0104) 
Decomposition of the change due to variables             
1.1. Child demographics (age and gender)  -0.004%  0.011%  -0.048%  0.132%  ----  ---- 
  (0.0005)  (0.0004)  (0.0003)  (0.0005)  ----  ---- 
1.2. Assets  0.285%  0.041%  0.556%  0.540%  0.279%  1.177% 
  (0.0009)  (0.0011)  (0.0013)  (0.0024)  (0.0030)  (0.0042) 
1.3. Household adult education  0.682%  0.560%  0.805%  0.732%  0.146%  1.764% 
  (0.0011)  (0.0010)  (0.0016)  (0.0017)  (0.0020)  (0.0029) 
1.4. Household demographics  0.424%  0.317%  0.536%  -0.481%  -0.356%  -0.326% 
  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0007)  (0.0011)  (0.0014)  (0.0019) 
1.5. Principal female working  -0.186%  -0.181%  -0.185%  0.069%  0.065%  0.063% 
  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0006)  (0.0008) 
1.6. Ethnicity  -0.143%  -0.084%  -0.202%  0.179%  0.128%  0.247% 
  (0.0004)  (0.0005)  (0.0005)  (0.0010)  (0.0013)  (0.0015) 
1.7 Religion  -0.043%  -0.060%  -0.024%  0.120%  0.183%  0.051% 
  (0.0002)  (0.0003)  (0.0002)  (0.0007)  (0.0010)  (0.0008) 
1.8. Rural villages supply  0.467%  0.384%  0.580%  -0.195%  -0.396%  -0.225% 
  (0.0007)  (0.0009)  (0.0011)  (0.0020)  (0.0029)  (0.0036) 
1.9. State variables  7.840%  6.573%  9.147%  1.961%  2.108%  1.701% 
  (0.0023)  (0.0029)  (0.0033)  (0.0057)  (0.0075)  (0.0086) 
             
2. Predicted Change due to coefficients  3.77%  2.23%  5.49%  0.99%  1.24%  0.53% 
  (0.0017)  (0.0021)  (0.0024)  (0.0044)  (0.0423)  (0.0066) 
             
Predicted Annual change due to variables  1.55%  1.26%  1.86%  0.51%  0.36%  0.74% 
             
Schooling level in 1998/99  82.52%  86.03%  78.72%  61.67%  61.56%  61.81% 
             
  Linear Prediction 
Predicted schooling level to 2015  100%  100%  100%  69.82%  67.31%  73.68% 
  Compound rate prediction 
Predicted schooling level to 2015  100%  100%  100%  66.89%  65.20%  69.57% 
 
Notes: The changes are in percentages and the standard deviation in parenthesis. The linear probability 
models upon which the decomposition is based are reported in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. Row 1 shows the 
predicted total change. This total change is decomposed into the change attributable to included regressors or 
variables (1) and the change associated with changes in coefficients (2). The change due to variables is 



















, 98 b b , where b
*
k are the coefficients estimated by pooling the data for 
the two NFHS rounds, 1992/3 and 1998/99. This is further decomposed into the contribution of nine groups 
of variables. The “predicted annual change due to variables” is simply the “predicted change due to 
variables” divided by 6, this being the number of years between 1992/3 and 1998/9. Linear predictions to the 
year 2015 (strictly, to 2014/2015) are made by adding to the 1998/99 schooling level the predicted change to 
2015, which is the result of multiplying the annual changes by 16, the number of years between 1998/9 and   30 





Appendix Table 1. Linear Probability Model of School Attendance for Children aged 6-11 
  NFHS1992/93  NFHS1998/99 
  Total  Boys  Girls  Total  Boys  Girls 
Age 7  0.1193  0.1201  0.0878  0.0889  0.0904  0.0724 
  (12.54)**  (12.60)**  (9.12)**  (11.40)**  (11.64)**  (8.50)** 
Age 8  0.1660  0.1672  0.0922  0.0946  0.0959  0.0681 
  (18.92)**  (19.04)**  (10.15)**  (13.14)**  (13.36)**  (8.48)** 
Age 9  0.1664  0.1717  0.1048  0.1010  0.1074  0.0724 
  (17.80)**  (18.37)**  (10.67)**  (13.03)**  (13.89)**  (8.26)** 
Age 10  0.1598  0.1618  0.0729  0.0830  0.0865  0.0251 
  (17.82)**  (18.01)**  (7.82)**  (11.02)**  (11.42)**  (2.95)** 
Age 11  0.1537  0.1656  0.0494  0.0725  0.0823  0.0094 
  (15.98)**  (17.17)**  (4.66)**  (8.70)**  (9.84)**  (0.97) 
female* Age 6  -0.0874  ----  ----  -0.0509  ----  ---- 
  (8.49)**  ----  ----  (5.61)**  ----  ---- 
female* Age 7  -0.1195  ----  ----  -0.0671  ----  ---- 
  (12.01)**  ----  ----  (8.41)**  ----  ---- 
female* Age 8  -0.1617  ----  ----  -0.0771  ----  ---- 
  (18.05)**  ----  ----  (10.40)**  ----  ---- 
female* Age 9  -0.1410  ----  ----  -0.0743  ----  ---- 
  (14.28)**  ----  ----  (9.05)**  ----  ---- 
female* Age 10  -0.1696  ----  ----  -0.1073  ----  ---- 
  (18.71)**  ----  ----  (13.76)**  ----  ---- 
female* Age 11  -0.1788  ----  ----  -0.1048  ----  ---- 
  (16.89)**  ----  ----  (11.03)**  ----  ---- 
Pucca house  0.0152  0.0053  0.0307  0.0071  0.0051  0.0076 
  (1.65)  (0.48)  (2.34)*  (0.90)  (0.53)  (0.69) 
Own flush toilet  -0.0196  -0.0055  -0.0359  -0.0110  -0.0021  -0.0226 
  (2.24)*  (0.54)  (2.80)**  (1.59)  (0.26)  (2.27)* 
Electricity  0.0834  0.0776  0.0874  0.0849  0.0705  0.1007 
  (5.84)**  (4.46)**  (4.40)**  (5.09)**  (3.38)**  (4.37)** 
Potable water into the house  0.0008  -0.0054  0.0072  0.0098  0.0040  0.0177 
  (0.08)  (0.47)  (0.53)  (1.29)  (0.43)  (1.67) 
Separate room for cooking  0.0052  0.0118  0.0001  0.0190  0.0181  0.0205 
  (0.54)  (1.03)  (0.01)  (2.59)**  (2.12)*  (1.92) 
Land owner  -0.0213  -0.0013  -0.0455  0.0105  0.0142  0.0096 
  (2.29)*  (0.11)  (3.28)**  (1.39)  (1.58)  (0.89) 
Livestock owner  0.0041  0.0095  -0.0008  0.0214  0.0238  0.0184 
  (0.35)  (0.70)  (0.05)  (2.20)*  (2.09)*  (1.35) 
Durables index   0.0173  0.0134  0.0217  0.0030  0.0035  0.0026 
  (6.44)**  (4.16)**  (5.60)**  (1.31)  (1.18)  (0.81) 
Rural* pucca house  0.0084  0.0014  0.0110  0.0044  -0.0079  0.0194 
  (0.69)  (0.10)  (0.64)  (0.46)  (0.69)  (1.45) 
Rural* own flush toilet  -0.0038  -0.0112  -0.0039  -0.0111  -0.0194  0.0017 
  (0.29)  (0.77)  (0.20)  (1.13)  (1.74)  (0.12) 
Rural* electricity  -0.0211  -0.0336  -0.0024  -0.0622  -0.0593  -0.0634 
  (1.38)  (1.79)  (0.11)  (3.58)**  (2.74)**  (2.63)** 
Rural* potable water into the house  0.0248  0.0311  0.0210  -0.0006  0.0048  -0.0090 
  (2.18)*  (2.25)*  (1.31)  (0.07)  (0.43)  (0.69) 
Rural* separate room for cooking  0.0478  0.0375  0.0567  0.0110  0.0099  0.0113   31 
  (4.33)**  (2.79)**  (3.65)**  (1.25)  (0.96)  (0.88) 
Rural* land owner  0.0687  0.0662  0.0722  0.0267  0.0382  0.0113 
  (6.00)**  (4.72)**  (4.38)**  (2.82)**  (3.37)**  (0.84) 
Rural* livestock owner  -0.0191  -0.0198  -0.0216  -0.0114  -0.0201  -0.0018 
  (1.43)  (1.22)  (1.14)  (1.02)  (1.52)  (0.12) 
Rural*Durables index  0.0119  0.0078  0.0161  0.0263  0.0224  0.0302 
  (2.85)**  (1.58)  (2.61)**  (7.73)**  (5.28)**  (6.37)** 
Schooling years of highest educated adult  0.0215  0.0172  0.0262  0.0139  0.0111  0.0172 
  (31.26)**  (21.49)**  (26.20)**  (25.37)**  (16.86)**  (21.83)** 
Highest educated adult is female  -0.0440  -0.0522  -0.0339  -0.0237  -0.0236  -0.0232 
  (7.98)**  (7.78)**  (4.38)**  (5.39)**  (4.48)**  (3.62)** 
Log Household size  -0.0352  -0.0322  -0.0454  -0.0428  -0.0455  -0.0431 
  (6.63)**  (4.62)**  (6.35)**  (8.79)**  (7.37)**  (6.38)** 
Proportion of female members under five  -0.1611  -0.1186  -0.2115  -0.1779  -0.0978  -0.2572 
  (4.92)**  (2.75)**  (4.72)**  (6.26)**  (2.70)**  (6.36)** 
Proportion of male members under five  -0.1540  -0.1093  -0.2164  -0.1845  -0.1410  -0.2332 
  (4.68)**  (2.54)*  (4.81)**  (6.50)**  (3.92)**  (5.77)** 
Proportion of female members aged 6 to 16  -0.0088  0.0188  -0.0596  -0.0283  -0.0158  -0.0419 
  (0.29)  (0.50)  (1.35)  (1.12)  (0.52)  (1.07) 
Proportion of male members aged 6 to 16  -0.0502  -0.1070  0.0204  -0.1088  -0.1335  -0.0864 
  (1.62)  (2.62)**  (0.48)  (4.11)**  (3.88)**  (2.32)* 
Proportion of female members aged 17 to 30  0.1595  0.1446  0.1721  0.1902  0.1703  0.2138 
  (6.22)**  (4.47)**  (4.78)**  (8.93)**  (6.65)**  (6.80)** 
Proportion of male members aged 17 to 30  -0.1734  -0.1628  -0.1963  -0.1425  -0.0952  -0.2088 
  (6.11)**  (4.51)**  (4.91)**  (5.87)**  (3.21)**  (5.88)** 
Proportion of female members aged more than 50  0.0798  0.0296  0.1422  0.0193  0.0105  0.0127 
  (2.13)*  (0.63)  (2.63)**  (0.61)  (0.26)  (0.27) 
Proportion of male members aged more than 50  0.0407  0.0159  0.0527  -0.0488  -0.0704  -0.0257 
  (0.99)  (0.30)  (0.91)  (1.33)  (1.54)  (0.48) 
Household head female  0.0416  0.0351  0.0491  0.0301  0.0108  0.0528 
  (4.12)**  (2.76)**  (3.57)**  (3.69)**  (1.04)  (4.57)** 
Child of head  0.0155  0.0153  0.0161  0.0104  0.0208  0.0009 
  (2.47)*  (1.89)  (1.82)  (1.81)  (2.89)**  (0.11) 
Principal female working  -0.0400  -0.0462  -0.0336  -0.0517  -0.0427  -0.0609 
  (7.61)**  (6.90)**  (4.72)**  (10.60)**  (7.13)**  (8.80)** 
Rural resident  -0.1132  -0.0904  -0.1370  -0.0030  0.0077  -0.0165 
  (6.45)**  (4.04)**  (5.71)**  (0.15)  (0.30)  (0.59) 
Scheduled caste  -0.0252  -0.0176  -0.0337  -0.0153  -0.0106  -0.0196 
  (3.41)**  (1.85)  (3.33)**  (2.80)**  (1.58)  (2.50)* 
scheduled tribe  -0.0878  -0.0950  -0.0779  -0.0863  -0.0933  -0.0777 
  (9.47)**  (7.97)**  (6.35)**  (10.37)**  (8.91)**  (6.60)** 
Muslim  -0.0668  -0.0851  -0.0479  -0.0425  -0.0625  -0.0226 
  (8.81)**  (8.72)**  (4.75)**  (6.36)**  (7.51)**  (2.51)* 
Christian  -0.0181  -0.0222  -0.0255  0.0306  0.0430  0.0177 
  (1.36)  (1.35)  (1.33)  (2.28)*  (2.80)**  (0.85) 
Other religion  -0.0280  -0.0293  -0.0219  -0.0418  -0.0508  -0.0244 
  (2.50)*  (2.10)*  (1.37)  (3.91)**  (3.80)**  (1.68) 
Rural*Distance to nearest town  -0.0002  -0.0001  -0.0004  -0.0006  -0.0007  -0.0005 
  (1.35)  (0.48)  (1.66)  (3.29)**  (3.02)**  (1.79) 
Rural*Distance pucca road  -0.0012  -0.0047  -0.0014  0.0032  0.0016  0.0041 
  (0.61)  (1.86)  (0.60)  (3.27)**  (1.29)  (3.21)** 
Rural*Distance to pucca road* primary School  0.0008  0.0021  0.0001  -0.0023  -0.0013  -0.0034 
  (0.39)  (0.81)  (0.03)  (2.32)*  (1.07)  (2.56)* 
Rural*Distance to pucca road* girl  -0.0036  ----  ----  -0.0008  ----  ----   32 
  (3.94)**  ----  ----  (1.91)  ----  ---- 
Rural* Village electrified  0.0154  0.0208  0.0128  0.0397  0.0323  0.0454 
  (1.96)  (2.07)*  (1.22)  (5.23)**  (3.47)**  (4.28)** 
Rural* Primary School in village  0.0292  0.0422  0.0140  0.0246  0.0226  0.0301 
  (2.77)**  (3.10)**  (0.99)  (2.51)*  (1.89)  (2.20)* 
Rural* Middle School in village  0.0234  0.0082  0.0365  -0.0012  -0.0014  0.0007 
  (3.21)**  (0.88)  (3.68)**  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.08) 
Rural* Secondary School in village  0.0070  0.0010  0.0142  0.0081  0.0055  0.0092 
  (0.91)  (0.10)  (1.32)  (1.23)  (0.68)  (0.95) 
Rural* Bank in village  0.0064  0.0045  0.0087  -0.0013  0.0035  -0.0061 
  (0.82)  (0.47)  (0.77)  (0.19)  (0.43)  (0.61) 
Rural* Post Office in village  -0.0110  -0.0130  -0.0058  -0.0106  -0.0084  -0.0121 
  (1.56)  (1.45)  (0.61)  (1.78)  (1.14)  (1.43) 
Rural*Number of tv sets in village per 1000 
habitants  0.0002  -0.0000  0.0005  0.0000  -0.0000  0.0000 
  (2.47)*  (0.29)  (3.41)**  (1.72)  (0.13)  (7.72)** 
Rural* missing number of tv sets  0.0445  0.0231  0.0837  -0.0012  0.0201  -0.0231 
  (1.53)  (0.61)  (2.09)*  (0.09)  (1.34)  (1.15) 
State-level variables             
log real GNP p.c.  0.3546  0.3739  0.3321  0.0162  0.0841  -0.0578 
  (13.88)**  (11.81)**  (9.29)**  (1.11)  (4.84)**  (2.72)** 
log(development expenditure/GNP)  0.0460  0.0528  0.0357  0.0032  0.0497  -0.0482 
  (1.78)  (1.65)  (0.99)  (0.15)  (1.93)  (1.57) 
log(education expenditure/GNP)  0.3416  0.3837  0.2984  -0.0916  -0.0223  -0.1684 
  (9.01)**  (8.20)**  (5.65)**  (4.85)**  (0.98)  (6.17)** 
rural poverty gap index  -0.0080  -0.0051  -0.0112  0.0003  -0.0004  0.0011 
  (8.99)**  (4.49)**  (9.05)**  (1.14)  (1.14)  (2.80)** 
urban poverty gap index  0.0049  0.0039  0.0063  0.0032  0.0014  0.0051 
  (2.89)**  (1.87)  (2.65)**  (5.44)**  (1.96)*  (5.94)** 
rural/urban mean p.c. consumption  -0.2004  -0.0035  -0.4175  0.0596  0.0288  0.0925 
  (4.64)**  (0.06)  (6.84)**  (9.77)**  (3.78)**  (10.53)** 
female illiteracy rate  0.1214  0.2566  -0.0367  -0.2342  -0.0231  -0.4667 
  (2.08)*  (3.53)**  (0.46)  (9.13)**  (0.77)  (12.27)** 
female/male illiteracy rate  0.2040  0.2022  0.1964  -0.0512  0.0164  -0.1229 
  (5.61)**  (4.45)**  (3.93)**  (4.22)**  (1.12)  (7.00)** 
female/male teachers in prim school  -0.0161  -0.0070  -0.0269  0.0004  0.0004  0.0005 
  (4.61)**  (1.61)  (5.50)**  (3.01)**  (2.01)*  (2.30)* 
Constant  0.6754  0.5345  0.8010  0.6001  0.5327  0.6231 
  (8.80)**  (5.57)**  (7.50)**  (11.31)**  (8.16)**  (8.38)** 
             
Observations  57740  30159  27581  56201  29212  26989 
R-squared  0.28  0.22  0.33  0.18  0.15  0.21 
Robust t statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%             
 
 
Appendix Table 2. Linear Probability Model of School Completion for children aged 12 years 
  NFHS1992/93  NFHS1998/99 
  Total  Boys  Girls  Total  Boys  Girls 
Female  -0.0388  ---  ---  -0.0514  ---  --- 
  (2.62)**  ---  ---  (4.07)**  ---  --- 
Pucca house  0.0266  0.0385  0.0031  0.0231  0.0418  0.0067 
  (1.16)  (1.25)  (0.09)  (1.08)  (1.45)  (0.21) 
Own flush toilet  -0.0271  -0.0442  -0.0116  0.0475  0.0517  0.0382   33 
  (1.27)  (1.51)  (0.36)  (2.37)*  (1.88)  (1.32) 
Electricity  0.1061  0.1299  0.0697  0.1214  0.0868  0.1674 
  (2.80)**  (2.64)**  (1.17)  (2.90)**  (1.64)  (2.53)* 
Potable water into the house  0.0030  0.0139  -0.0074  0.0144  0.0143  0.0113 
  (0.13)  (0.42)  (0.22)  (0.70)  (0.49)  (0.38) 
Separate room for cooking  0.0425  0.0369  0.0535  0.0399  0.0485  0.0265 
  (1.77)  (1.11)  (1.53)  (1.89)  (1.64)  (0.89) 
Land owner  0.0125  0.0115  0.0184  -0.0150  -0.0097  -0.0248 
  (0.52)  (0.34)  (0.55)  (0.64)  (0.29)  (0.77) 
Livestock owner  -0.0127  -0.0116  -0.0172  0.0087  0.0381  -0.0248 
  (0.47)  (0.32)  (0.44)  (0.34)  (1.12)  (0.66) 
Durables index   0.0306  0.0265  0.0355  0.0061  0.0007  0.0139 
  (4.64)**  (2.91)**  (3.72)**  (0.94)  (0.08)  (1.42) 
Rural* pucca house  -0.0067  -0.0107  0.0115  -0.0007  -0.0027  -0.0077 
  (0.22)  (0.26)  (0.25)  (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.19) 
Rural* own flush toilet  0.0162  0.0157  0.0173  -0.0231  -0.0662  0.0291 
  (0.50)  (0.35)  (0.37)  (0.77)  (1.61)  (0.66) 
Rural* electricity  -0.0305  -0.0550  0.0136  -0.0692  -0.0634  -0.0845 
  (0.76)  (1.05)  (0.21)  (1.58)  (1.13)  (1.22) 
Rural* potable water into the house  0.0088  0.0140  -0.0057  -0.0273  -0.0322  -0.0136 
  (0.31)  (0.36)  (0.14)  (1.13)  (0.96)  (0.39) 
Rural* separate room for cooking  -0.0084  -0.0179  0.0144  -0.0201  -0.0278  -0.0080 
  (0.30)  (0.47)  (0.34)  (0.82)  (0.82)  (0.23) 
Rural* land owner  0.0543  0.0596  0.0397  0.0271  0.0370  0.0304 
  (1.84)  (1.47)  (0.93)  (1.00)  (0.97)  (0.79) 
Rural* livestock owner  -0.0356  -0.0096  -0.0700  -0.0068  -0.0361  0.0253 
  (1.11)  (0.22)  (1.47)  (0.23)  (0.92)  (0.59) 
Rural*Durables index  -0.0108  -0.0099  -0.0138  0.0239  0.0331  0.0117 
  (1.05)  (0.70)  (0.90)  (2.59)**  (2.68)**  (0.85) 
Schooling years of highest educated adult  0.0175  0.0166  0.0199  0.0201  0.0202  0.0202 
  (10.28)**  (7.33)**  (7.72)**  (13.58)**  (9.99)**  (9.35)** 
Highest educated adult is female  0.0462  0.0412  0.0493  0.0347  0.0337  0.0336 
  (3.43)**  (2.35)*  (2.35)*  (2.92)**  (2.09)*  (1.92) 
Log Household size  -0.0220  -0.0122  -0.0363  -0.0220  -0.0178  -0.0357 
  (1.60)  (0.65)  (1.73)  (1.80)  (1.08)  (1.97)* 
Proportion of female members under five  -0.0907  -0.0178  -0.1776  -0.4848  -0.3181  -0.6738 
  (0.95)  (0.14)  (1.28)  (5.59)**  (2.68)**  (5.36)** 
Proportion of male members under five  -0.3044  -0.2244  -0.4076  -0.4751  -0.2775  -0.6948 
  (3.12)**  (1.75)  (2.68)**  (5.60)**  (2.41)*  (5.54)** 
Proportion of female members aged 6 to 16  -0.0063  0.0185  -0.0738  -0.0569  0.0903  -0.2514 
  (0.08)  (0.18)  (0.65)  (0.90)  (1.06)  (2.64)** 
Proportion of male members aged 6 to 16  -0.0573  -0.0105  -0.0882  -0.2664  -0.1686  -0.3546 
  (0.76)  (0.10)  (0.77)  (4.03)**  (1.87)  (3.63)** 
Proportion of female members aged 17 to 30  -0.0178  -0.0099  -0.0140  -0.0646  -0.0318  -0.1040 
  (0.26)  (0.11)  (0.14)  (1.12)  (0.41)  (1.19) 
Proportion of male members aged 17 to 30  -0.2906  -0.3358  -0.2570  -0.4379  -0.3885  -0.4980 
  (3.85)**  (3.39)**  (2.22)*  (6.57)**  (4.39)**  (4.94)** 
Proportion of female members aged more than 50  0.0389  0.0279  0.0613  -0.0751  0.0801  -0.2744 
  (0.41)  (0.23)  (0.41)  (0.89)  (0.71)  (2.21)* 
Proportion of male members aged more than 50  0.1568  0.1938  0.1225  0.0049  0.1637  -0.1763 
  (1.68)  (1.60)  (0.84)  (0.06)  (1.51)  (1.41) 
Household head female  -0.0051  0.0046  -0.0117  0.0565  0.0290  0.0913 
  (0.22)  (0.14)  (0.35)  (2.79)**  (1.04)  (3.05)** 
Child of head  -0.0196  -0.0445  0.0161  0.0184  0.0355  0.0002   34 
  (1.22)  (2.13)*  (0.65)  (1.25)  (1.81)  (0.01) 
Principal female working  -0.0104  -0.0309  0.0180  -0.0196  -0.0008  -0.0429 
  (0.80)  (1.81)  (0.90)  (1.62)  (0.05)  (2.38)* 
Rural resident  -0.0106  -0.0256  -0.0174  0.0690  0.0308  0.0853 
  (0.23)  (0.42)  (0.23)  (1.37)  (0.48)  (1.08) 
Scheduled caste  -0.0010  0.0121  -0.0250  -0.0078  -0.0064  -0.0051 
  (0.06)  (0.50)  (0.80)  (0.56)  (0.34)  (0.24) 
scheduled tribe  -0.1090  -0.0701  -0.1631  -0.0674  -0.0891  -0.0420 
  (4.26)**  (2.13)*  (4.08)**  (3.43)**  (3.41)**  (1.40) 
Muslim  -0.0714  -0.0883  -0.0478  -0.1054  -0.1338  -0.0760 
  (3.81)**  (3.49)**  (1.71)  (6.72)**  (6.25)**  (3.36)** 
Christian  -0.0158  0.0606  -0.1023  -0.0794  -0.1255  -0.0186 
  (0.49)  (1.47)  (2.23)*  (2.23)*  (2.67)**  (0.34) 
Other religion  -0.0679  -0.1046  -0.0257  -0.1075  -0.1225  -0.0968 
  (2.50)*  (2.78)**  (0.66)  (3.46)**  (2.97)**  (2.11)* 
Rural*Distance to nearest town  -0.0007  -0.0010  -0.0002  -0.0005  0.0005  -0.0017 
  (1.45)  (1.67)  (0.32)  (0.97)  (0.81)  (2.43)* 
Rural*Distance pucca road  -0.0155  -0.0150  -0.0158  -0.0002  0.0006  -0.0003 
  (2.64)**  (2.37)*  (1.24)  (0.09)  (0.18)  (0.09) 
Distance to pucca road* primary School  0.0166  0.0150  0.0169  0.0007  -0.0006  0.0012 
  (2.77)**  (2.27)*  (1.30)  (0.29)  (0.19)  (0.34) 
Distance to pucca road* girl  -0.0035  ---  ---  -0.0004  ---  --- 
  (1.04)  ---  ---  (0.31)  ---  --- 
Rural* Village electrified  0.0183  0.0091  0.0378  0.0295  0.0317  0.0251 
  (0.87)  (0.34)  (1.08)  (1.63)  (1.33)  (0.89) 
Rural* Primary School in village  0.0020  0.0390  -0.0538  -0.0405  -0.0245  -0.0475 
  (0.07)  (1.08)  (1.08)  (1.66)  (0.76)  (1.29) 
Rural* Middle School in village  0.0062  0.0120  0.0035  0.0114  -0.0096  0.0410 
  (0.33)  (0.50)  (0.12)  (0.75)  (0.48)  (1.80) 
Rural* Secondary School in village  0.0611  0.0704  0.0410  0.0346  0.0309  0.0369 
  (3.09)**  (2.73)**  (1.36)  (2.05)*  (1.36)  (1.47) 
Rural* Bank in village  0.0193  0.0092  0.0399  -0.0126  -0.0278  -0.0004 
  (0.96)  (0.34)  (1.31)  (0.69)  (1.12)  (0.02) 
Rural* Post Office in village  -0.0313  -0.0403  -0.0174  0.0194  0.0235  0.0143 
  (1.70)  (1.68)  (0.61)  (1.27)  (1.16)  (0.63) 
Rural*Number of tv sets in village per 1000 hab.  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0000  0.0007  -0.0000 
  (1.29)  (0.62)  (1.61)  (0.11)  (2.05)*  (0.07) 
Rural* missing number of tv sets  -0.1020  -0.0861  -0.1158  -0.0393  -0.0063  -0.0659 
  (1.23)  (0.85)  (0.78)  (1.21)  (0.15)  (1.29) 
State-level variables             
log real GNP p.c.  0.1825  0.1719  0.1873  0.1314  0.1246  0.1172 
  (2.82)**  (2.05)*  (1.87)  (3.41)**  (2.45)*  (1.98)* 
log(development expenditure/GNP)  0.2734  0.3044  0.2428  0.2648  0.3724  0.1564 
  (4.13)**  (3.45)**  (2.44)*  (4.60)**  (4.76)**  (1.83) 
log(education expenditure/GNP)  -0.0001  -0.0460  0.0303  -0.0225  -0.0393  -0.0402 
  (0.00)  (0.37)  (0.21)  (0.46)  (0.60)  (0.54) 
rural poverty gap index  0.0083  0.0088  0.0071  -0.0012  -0.0023  0.0000 
  (3.50)**  (2.81)**  (1.98)*  (1.71)  (2.36)*  (0.04) 
urban poverty gap index  0.0111  0.0081  0.0139  -0.0013  -0.0021  -0.0010 
  (2.64)**  (1.44)  (2.19)*  (0.85)  (0.98)  (0.41) 
rural/urban mean p.c. consumption  0.2741  0.3766  0.1207  0.0974  0.0782  0.1159 
  (2.48)*  (2.52)*  (0.73)  (5.92)**  (3.53)**  (4.66)** 
female illiteracy rate  -0.5735  -0.4999  -0.6729  -0.3691  -0.3380  -0.4780 
  (4.03)**  (2.65)**  (3.09)**  (5.50)**  (3.84)**  (4.60)**   35 
female/male illiteracy rate  -0.2981  -0.2611  -0.3436  -0.0046  0.0357  -0.0663 
  (3.40)**  (2.24)*  (2.56)*  (0.15)  (0.86)  (1.43) 
female/male teachers in prim school  0.0027  0.0004  0.0017  -0.0035  -0.0029  -0.0043 
  (0.31)  (0.03)  (0.13)  (9.64)**  (5.97)**  (7.98)** 
Constant  1.1718  0.9254  1.4308  0.9031  0.9425  0.8795 
  (6.13)**  (3.60)**  (5.01)**  (6.77)**  (5.19)**  (4.43)** 
             
Observations  8225  4807  3418  9240  5262  3978 
R-squared  0.17  0.16  0.21  0.23  0.22  0.27 
Robust t statistics in parentheses             
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%             
 